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The Netherlands Bank, the central bank in the Netherlands, has gradu-
ally changed in character. Some acts affecting the Bank's structure,
powers, and functions have been adopted since World War II. The
Bank's constitution and the definition of its functions are incorporated
primarily in legislation enacted in 1948.
The Netherlands Bank is almost entirely independent of the govern-
ment. Its Board of Managers and its President are appointed by the
Crown for periods of seven years. Representatives of the government
participate in meetings of the larger Bank Council in an advisory
capacity. The Finance Minister may formally give instructions to the
Board of Managers; the latter is entitled, in this case, to present its ob-
jections to the Crown, which then has to make public both the argu-
ments and counter-arguments and the final decisions it reaches. In
effect, no such instructions have ever been given since the 1948 Act,
and the Bank may thus be regarded as independent of the Ministry of
Finance.
Banking institutions in the Netherlands vary widely in functions and
structure. The greater part of banking transactions are conducted by
regular commercial banks. These are highly concentrated: a few large
banks, each with a large number of branches (up to 200 or 250), play
a dominant role. The assets of the four largest banks amount to some
60 per cent of the total assets of commercial banks, and those of
thirty-three "representative" banks to 95 per cent. The high measure
of concentration and the ease of communication may be important
reasons for the tendency of the Netherlands Bank to act as much as
possible by agreement with the banks rather than by directives andTHE NETHERLANDS 177
coercion; these factors also contribute to the high level of mutual under-
standing which is found between the Bank and the commercial banks.
The Netherlands Bank employs primarily the three classical instru-
ments of monetary policy: changes in the discount rate, changes in
minimum-reserve ratios of the banks, and open-market operations. To
a lesser extent, it also applies quantitative credit controls.
The Discount Rate. Lending by the Netherlands Bank to commercial
banks takes three forms. First, it may be done by discounting at the
Bank. Eligible for discounting is short-term paper, such as Treasury
bills or commercial bills of not over 105 days to maturity. More often,
banks will resort to the second possibility, which is receiving advances
on current account against the pledge of collateral—usually of Trea-
sury bills. The rate charged by the Bank on these advances is one-half
of 1 per cent above the discount rate. Finally, the Bank may buy
Treasury paper from the banks with a repurchase stipulation. Tech-
nically, the Netherlands Bank regards such a transaction as the
equivalent of a lending operation rather than an open-market operation.
In general, lending by the Bank to the commercial banks is very
slight, and so are the absolute fluctuations in the amount of lending.
Borrowing from the Bank is considered an emergency act, intended for
the shortest duration, rather than one intended to add reserves to the
borrowing bank for any length of time.
Changes in the discount rate thus have a very slight impact on the
size of the banking system's reserves, since the amount of borrowing
from the Bank is generally insignificant in relation to the size of
reserves. However, the discount rate is considered an important yard-
stick. Changes in it are supposed to reflect the intentions of the Nether-
lands Bank, thus giving a directive to the commercial banks with
regard to the tightening or relaxation of credit supply. A conventional
semi-automatic relationship exists between the discount rate and the
commercial banks' interest on their lending. Usually, the rate charged
on lending to prime borrowers from the banks is about 2 per cent
above the discount rate, although it could not fall below the level of
5 per cent.
Minimum-Reserve Ratios. Minimum-reserve policy was, most often,
the major tool of the Netherlands Bank after 1954. Although the Bank
was empowered by law to impose minimum-reserve ratios on the bank-
ing system, it preferred to do so by agreement. In February 1954, a
gentlemen's agreement was concluded between the Bank and some
forty commercial banks, which in their aggregate constituted the over-178DEMAND POLICIES AND OF PAYMENTS
whelming majority of the banking system. According to the agreement,
the participating banks were required to maintain balances at the
Netherlands Bank at a ratio to their deposits determined by the Bank.
Subject to this requirement were all sight and time deposits, excluding
saving deposits and deposits in foreign currency. The ratio is the same
for all types of banks and deposits covered by the agreement. It was
not, however, to exceed 15 per cent, and the Netherlands Bank under-
took not to raise it above 10 per cent without first selling Treasury
paper in the open market on a large scale. In fact, the ratio has always
stayed within the 10 per cent Emit. The lower limit of fluctuations in
the ratio was 4 per cent for most of the time. During 1963, however,
it was reduced to zero and has stayed at that level since; that is, the
minimum-reserve ratio has not been used as a policy instrument since
mid-1963. Before that, on the other hand, changes in the ratio had been
rather frequent.
The gentlemen's agreement was concluded at a time when commer-
cial banks were extremely liquid due to an influx of foreign exchange.
Market rates of three-month Treasury bills came down to as low as .4
per cent, and the Netherlands Bank was not equipped to eliminate
liquidity to the desired extent by open-market operations. The reason
for the highly liquid position of the banks is well reflected in the agree-
ment itself. Given its importance, this part of the agreement deserves
to be quoted:
In view of the desire of the Netherlands Bank that the commercial banks
should make a contribution towards financing the greatly increased stock
of gold and foreign exchange the undersigned [name of bank] is prepared
to enter into a gentlemen's agreement with the Netherlands Bank, directed
to the maintenance at the Netherlands Bank of a cash reserve adaptable in
relation to the movement in the stock of gold and foreign exchange.1
This relationship was explained by the Netherlands Bank in terms
of equity:
•..thecentral bank must be supplied with...resourcesfor the pur-
pose of holding [stock of gold and foreign exchange]. Unless it is desired
that these resources shall be provided by the Treasury, that is to say at the
cost of the taxpayer, they will have to come from the banks—which in our
modern national economy provide a part of the money in circulation, just
as much as the Netherlands Bank does, and enjoy the resulting benefits in
1 Preamble to the gentlemen's agreement, Netherlands Bank Report, 1953,
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the form of interest. It is no more than reasonable that, as against these
benefits, the banks should also contribute towards providing the means for
carrying the international cover for the country's money.2
The exceptions to the rule of behavior indicated in these passages
are also explained in terms of equity. Suppose credit supply increases
thanks to some autonomous factor. As a result of this expansion, ex-
ternal reserves fall. There would be no need under these circumstances
to increase commercial bank profits by increasing their lending capac-
ity, since the banks already had their credit raised at the beginning of
the process. For such reasons, the Netherlands Bank stated that the
relationship of the reserve ratio to gold and foreign-exchange reserves
should not be entirely rigid, but that the Bank would investigate the
reasons for the movements of foreign-exchange reserves in each case.
Open-Market Operations. Until 1952, open-market operations were
conducted by the Treasury. In July 1952, an agreement between the
Treasury and the Netherlands Bank specified that the former would
limit itself to issuing new Treasury paper when old paper fails due,
and since that time open-market operations have been conducted by the
Netherlands Bank. But this does not rule out other financial operations
by the Treasury, which, as will be noted later, have the same effect as
open-market operations.
Although the Bank is empowered to deal in a variety of papers, its
stock—and its operations—have been restricted to Treasury paper.
These are mainly Treasury bonds with a maturity of one to five years.
The stock of this paper held by the Bank at the beginning of its opera-
tions, in 1952, was later replenished by converting part of the
sury's book debt to the Bank into Treasury paper, as well as by the
transfer—against Treasury paper—of claims on the EPU from the
Bank to the Treasury.
Open-market operations are not transacted with commercial banks.
They are handled by special brokers, who buy and sell both for their
clients and on their own account, financing the latter transactions by
borrowing on the call-money market and, on occasion, by resorting to.
rediscounting at the Netherlands Bank. While the greater part of the
Treasury paper which serves as instrument in open-market operations
is held by banking institutions, a substantial proportion is also held by
others, such as institutional investors, corporations, or households.
Open-market operations appear most of the time to be periodic
2Ibid.,p. 79.i8oDEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
rather than continuous: they are usually concentrated within short
periods and not conducted gradually in small amounts.
Quantitative Controls. The Netherlands Bank is entitled by law to
impose quantitative (as well as qualitative) restrictions on credit. In
1954, the Bank also concluded a gentlemen's agreement with the banks
to that effect. The provisions of this agreement were not implemented;
but on one occasion, between the fall of 1957 and the spring of 1958,
the Bank tried to impose credit ceilings by charging penalty rates on
the amounts by which the Bank's lending to commercial banks exceeded
specified ceilings. In 1960, a new gentlemen's agreement was con-
cluded by which quotas may be imposed on each bank's credit accord-
ing to a uniform formula relating the size of credit to its size at some
base period. A commercial bank which exceeds its quota would have
to deposit at the Netherlands Bank, interest-free, an amount equal to
the excess. In July 1961, the banks were directed under the stipulations
of this agreement not to let the size of their lending exceed that of the
base period (which was either the last quarter of 1960 or the corre-
sponding month of the previous year) by more than 15 per cent. After
that date, the banks were allowed to increase lending by .5 per cent
per month. Since August 1962, it was found that this restriction was
not effective; the actual size of credit was below the size permitted. The
restrictions were removed altogether in January 1963. In September
1963, however, they were renewed and remained in effect until the
end of the period investigated. The average amount of each bank's
credit during the first half of 1963 was taken as the base. By the end
of September 1963, the amount of the banks' lending should not have
exceeded the base amount by more than 5 per cent; from that month
on, expansions of credit by 1 per cent or .5 per cent per month were
allowed, for a total of 3 per cent (of the base amount) during the last
quarter of 1963, 9 per cent in 1964, and 10 per cent in 1965. In 1966,
credit expansion was restricted to 8 per cent of the outstanding amount
at the end of 1965; this rate represents a total, however, of a few
imposed ceilings, which became gradually more restrictive.
In the last few years of the period, the Netherlands Bank thus
appears, to have used quantitative restrictions of credit to a significant
extent. The Bank has also, on a few occasions, exercised its authority
to restrict certain types of credit.
Occasionally, the Bank tried to prevent what it considered an exces-
sive credit expansion by "moral suasion." Due to the close relationship
between the Bank and commercial banks, this may have had someTHE NETHERLANDS i8i
effect. However, in general, the Bank did not rely on this means as an
important policy instrument.
FISCAL AND DEBT POLICY
The central government's budget consists of an ordinary, and an
extraordinary, section. The latter always shows a large deficit—its
expenditures may be as much as five or six times larger than its
revenues. In the ordinary budget, on the other hand, a surplus is nor-
mally maintained. Most of the time, the surplus in the ordinary budget
is smaller than the deficit in the extraordinary budget, so that total
expenditures exceed total revenues. The difference is usually financed
by borrowing from the public.
The central government maintains a strong influence on local budg-
ets. The major source of the municipalities' normal revenue is trans-
fers from the central government, which assigns 12 per cent of its tax
revenues to the Municipalities Fund and, in addition, finances major
local expenditures such as the costs of police and education. Borrowing
by the municipalities in the form of general quantitative ceilings, ceil-
ings on the rate of interest, and requirements for ad hoc approval of
borrowing by the government.
The Treasury's cash balances are held exclusively at the Netherlands
Bank, while those of local authorities are held outside it. According to
the 1948 Bank Act, the Treasury is entitled to automatic advances from
the Bank within II. 150 million; beyond that, current advances to the
Treasury may be given at the Bank's discretion. In effect, such advances
have been negligible, usually nonexistent. The Bank extends credit to
the government, instead, by purchasing Treasury bills. Variations in
the size of this credit too are usually not considerable. In the earlier
years of the period the Bank held a substantial book claim on the
Treasury. From early 1952, this was gradually diminished until it dis-
appeared completely by the beginning of 1958. On the other hand, in
the earlier part of the period, the government maintained "special de-
posits" at the Bank, representing the counterpart funds of foreign aid.
These grew considerably until early 1952, but declined continuously
from then on until they too disappeared in early 1958.
Thus, until 1958, the movement in the government's net indebted-
ness to the Netherlands Bank was dominated by the movement of the
Treasury's book debt and "special deposits," and to some extent by the
movement of Treasury bills. Since then, the major sources of variations182DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
in the size of this indebtedness are the Treasury bills and, even more
often, the government's deposits. The latter are a highly fluctuating
category: weekly or monthly changes in them are very large in com-
parison with long-term movements.
Besides financing budgetary deficits, the government very often con-
ducts financial transactions with the public for the exclusive purpose
of affecting monetary conditions. It may, for instance, borrow from
the public and deposit the proceeds at the Netherlands Bank. Changes
in the government's net indebtedness to the Bank thus reflect not only
the cash balance of its budgetary operations but also its financial trans-
actions with the public. To an extent, therefore, the government con-
ducts financial operations which have the same effect as, and may be
regarded as a substitute for, open-market operations of the Bank.
2. Statistical Analysis
Movements of external reserves in the Netherlands do not give evidence
of any cyclical pattern. An attempt to divide the whole period into
cycles and use cyclical analysis does not, therefore, seem to be very
useful. However, though a strong upward trend of reserves is apparent,
a substantial number of episodes in which reserves declined, or rose
with particular rapidity, make the analysis of policy reactions to bal-
ance-of-payments disturbances possible.
•In Table 9-1, the period is divided into subperiods according to the
fluctuations of the balance of payments. This division is based, until
1958, on the movements of external reserves and, from 1958 onward,
on the IMF data of surpluses and deficits in the balance of payments,
which series almost invariably gives results similar to those provided
by the series of external reserves.
It may be seen that the discount rate is changed most often in the
direction that would be required for balance-of-payments adjustment.
Only in one subperiod—during 1950—is an opposite movement found;
while in a few other cases the discount rate remained stable when
balance-of-payments adjustment would have required some change.
This relationship is further examined in Table 9-2, which gives the
direction of balance-of-payments movements during all quarters in
which changes were made in the discount rate. It appears, again, thatTHE NETHERLANDS 183
discount rate changes were consistent with balance-of-payments re-
quirements. This is true particularly with regard to all the changes
made before 1962. Out of fourteen such discount rate movements, only
one was in the opposite direction to the requirements of adjustment;
three took place when no balance-of-payments adjustment was re-
quired; and ten could be explained by the requirements for balance-of-
payments adjustment.
Tcr help test this association still further, Table 9-2 also gives the
movements of alternative target variables. It appears that the price
stability target performs, in general, about as well as the balance-of-
payments adjustment target—and better from 1962 on. On the basis
of this evidence, one could not assert that the discount rate was used
exclusively for balance-of-payments adjustment. It is evident that the
requirements of the two targets—balance-of-payments equilibrium and
price stability—coincided most of the time, so that the discount rate
changes were consistent with both. This coincidence of the two targets
may be expected in a country whose share in world trade is not very
large, and the share of whose trade in its own economy is substantial.
Changes in conditions abroad are likely to have only small impact on
the trade of such a country; while inflationary or deflationary pressures
within the economy, which are likely to be reflected in price movements,
may be expected to have an immediate and substantial effect on the
country's trade balance.
Movements of the other two targets examined in Table 9-2----indus-
trial production and employment—.do not reveal any consistent pattern
in relation to discount rate changes. It appears from the evidence of
this table that these two were not usually regarded as the targets at the
service of which the discount rate is employed.
Column 3 of Table 9-1 shows the changes in another short-term
interest rate, which is often quoted in the Netherlands: the rate (yield)
of three-month Treasury bills. As may be seen from Chart 9-1, the
movements of this rate and of the discount rate are highly correlated.
It is thus not surprising that Table 9-1 shows this variable also moving
in a way which is, by and large, consistent with the requirements for
balance-of-payments adjustment.
In column 4 of Table 9-1, movements of the minimum-reserve ratio
are described for 1954 through 1963, the period during which this
instrument was used. It appears that, throughout these years, this vari-
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TABLE 9-2
THE NETHERLANDS: CHANGES IN THE DISCOUNT RATE



















in 1950 * stable * stable + high +high
II 1951 + fall + rises — low *stable
i 1956 * stable * stable * normal *stable
iv 1956 + fall * stable * normal *stable
m 1957 + fall + rises — low • —rises
iv 1959 * stable + rises + high +falls
ii 1962 — rise + rises * normal *stable
x 1964 * stable
• + rises * normal *stable
ii 1964 * stable + rises * normal *stable
ii 1966 * stable + rises * normal *stable
Lowered:
i 1952 + rise — rises + low +rises
in 1952 + rise + falls + low .+rises
ii 1953 + rise + falls — high —falls
in 1956 — fall * stable * normal —falls
i 1958 + rise + falls + low rises
ii 1958 + rise + falls + low +rises
iv 1958 + rise + falls — high +high
x1959 + rise + falls * normal —falls
i 1963 * stable — rises + low *stable
NOTE: For explanation of symbols, see Table 8-3.
balance-of-payments adjustment. This relationshipisexamined in
greater detail in Table 9-3, which lists all the quarters in which the
reserve ratio was changed.3 The impression which emerges from this
Excluded from this table are the changes through the first half of 1954. When
reserve requirements were first introduced, by the gentlemen's agreement of
February 1954, the rate was determined at 5 per cent, and was then increased
each month by 1 per cent, until it reached the level of 10 per cent. These in-
creases, however1 should be regarded as part of the gradual process of establishing



























































































































































































































THE NETHERLANDS: CHANGES IN THE MINIMUM-



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
a -1956 lowered — fall * stable * normal — falls
iv 1956 lowered — fall * stable * normal * stable
i 1957 lowered — fall — rises * normal * stable
Iv 1957 lowered + rise — rises + low + rises
i 1958 raised — rise — falls — low — rises
ii 1958 raised — rise — falls — low — rises
in 1958 raised — rise — falls * normal — rises
a 1959 lowered — fall + falls — high + high
in 1960 raised — rise — falls + high + falls
i 1961 raised — rise — falls * normal + falls
1961 raised — rise — falls — low * stable
1961 lowered+ rise * stable — low * stable
iv 1961 lowered + rise — rises * normal * stable
a 1962 raised — rise + rises * normal * stable
in 1962 lowered * stable + falls * normal * stable
iv 1962 lowered — fall + falls + low * stable
111963 lowered + rise — rises + low * stable
in 1963 lowered — fall + falls — high * stable
NOTE: For explanation of symbols, see Table 8-3.
established and governed the instrument under consideration, and the
mode of operations which the agreement specified. As will be remem-
bered, the agreement stated that movements of the minimum-reserve
ratio should, as a rule, be positively correlated with movements of
foreign-exchange reserves: when the latter rise, the ratio should be
raised, and vice versa. This, of course, is a policy which works in the
opposite direction from what. balance-of-payments adjustment would
require. The agreement did not call for a strict adherence to this rule,190DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
and the Netherlands Bank was always careful to point this out. Yet,
throughout the 1950's, this was virtually an airtight rule.4 Only in the
1960's did this practice change, and exceptions to it became as frequent
as observance of it.
The competing targets are also observed in Table 9-3. It appears that
the minimum-reserve ratio was definitely not used to maintain price
stability; the ratio was changed in the direction opposite, as a rule, to
that which price stability would require—a relationship which must be
attributed to the correlation between price movements and imbalances
of payments noted earlier. Once more, this seems to change during
the 1960's. From 1962 on (to the effective abolition of the use of
this instrument toward the end of 1963), changes in the reserve ratio
were mostly consistent with the requirements of price stability, and
might be explained by this target. On the other hand, no consistent
relationship appears between changes in the minimum-reserve ratio,
on the one hand, and either the level of unemployment or the level of
industrial production, on the other. It appears quite safe to conclude
that, like the discount rate, the minimum-reserve ratio was not generally
employed either to serve the ends of high industrial production or high
employment.
The third monetary instrument, open-market operations, is shown in
column 5ofTable 9-1. It appears to move less often in the direction
required for balance-of-payments adjustment than it does in the oppo-
site direction; but, over all, the relation between this instrument and
the movements, of external reserves seems to be much weaker than that
between either the discount rate or the minimum-reserve ratio and
movements of external reserves. Open-market operations were taken,
we recall, rather sporadically. They seemed to have been intended most
of the time to "stabilize the market"—that is, to help maintain an
existing level of interest rates. Apparently, they were considered a
secondary tool rather than a major one and were not universally em-
ployed in pursuit of one of the major global targets.
Commercial-bank borrowing from the Netherlands Bank is described
in column 6 of Table 9-1. It will be recalled that, as a rule, the amount
Just a single exception is found, in the last quarter of 1957: while external
reserves were rising, the minimum-reserve ratio was lowered, rather than raised,
as was the normal practice. This, however, may perhaps be ascribed to a time
lag and imperfections of knowledge and measurement. The ratio was lowered in
October 1957; external reserves were falling until September 1957, and then
started rising only just before the ratio was lowered.THE NETHERLANDS 191
of this borrowing was very small; hence changes in it were of no
quantitative signfficance either. In only two instances did the amount
of borrowing rise to considerable proportions—during the two discern-
ible episodes of substantial declines of external reserves in 1951 and
1956—67. In both instances it dropped back to its normal low level in
the subsequent periods of rising external reserves. These, of course, are
movements in a direction opposite to the requirements of balance-of-
payments adjustment. It should also be noted that they are in a direc-
tion opposite to that which movements of the discount rate should
engender: that is, in both episodes, commercial-bank borrowing in-
creased when the discount rate was lowered.
The net indebtedness of the government to the Netherlands Bank
(excluding changes due to open-market operations) is illustrated next,
in column 7 of Table 9-1. It appears immediately that its movements
were usually in a direction opposite to the requirements of balance-of-
payments adjustment: the indebtedness rises, most often, when external
reserves fall, and falls when reserves rise. A glance at column 12, which
describes the budgetary balance, will show that this pattern is quite
similar to that of the movements of the budgetary balance, but is even
more consistent in its negative relationship to the balance of payments.
This greater consistency must be attributed to the government's finan-
cial transactions with the public—in distinction to the "real" transac-
tions which find expression in the budget. In other words, the gov-
ernment must have conducted its equivalent of open-market operations
—borrowing from the public and depositing at the central bank, or
repaying (lending to) the public by drawing on deposits at the Bank
—in a direction opposite to balance-of-payments requirements. To
some extent, this seems to have been due to public initiative. 'When
external reserves fall and reduce the economy's liquidity, banks (and
other potential buyers) are less likely to increase their lending to
the government (i.e., to buy Treasury bills or bonds), and more likely
to reduce the amount of these assets held by them; and the opposite is
true when the economy's liquidity increases by an accumulation of ex-
ternal reserves.
Total domestic claims of the Netherlands Bank, the combination of
the last three elements (Bank lending to the commercial banks, Bank
acquisition of government paper in the open market, and other net
lending of the Bank to the government), is illustrated in column 8 of
Table 9-1. The net claim on the government was usually the main
component of this category and accounted for most of the changes in192DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
it. Since it (as well as Bank lending to the banks) moved in the oppo-
site, direction to the requirements of balance-of-payments adjustment,
it is, of course, not surprising to find that so did the combined cate-
gory. Indeed, this pattern was even more consistent for the total than
for each of its components: only a single exception—the period from
mid-1953 to mid-1954—appears to violate this inverse relationship.
Lending by commercial banks to their customers, described in col-
umn 9 of Table 9-1, appears to move in the disadjusting direction. It
rises faster than usual when external reserves fall, and falls (or rises
only much less than the trend) when reserves rise. This inverse
tionship seems to be clearly indicated, although there are a few excep-
tions to it.
Quite the opposite pattern applies to changes in money supply, as is
shown in column 10 of Table 9-1. It moves almost invariably in the
direction which balance-of-payments adjustment would require. Money
supply and external reserves appear clearly to rise together and fall
together. Essentially, this is true also with regard to another measure
of the economy's liquidity, to which much attention is given in the
monetary analysis of the Netherlands Bank: the magnitude of "primary
and secondary liquidity,"which is described in column 11 of Table
9-1. Like money supply, which is itself, of course, a major component
(roughly two-thirds) of "primary and secondary liquidity," this moves
most of the time in the direction indicated by the need for balance-of-
payments adjustment, that is, in the same direction as external reserves.
Budgetary policy is described in column 12 of Table 9-1. As has
been mentioned before, it appears to run most often in a direction con-
trary to the requirements of balance-of-payments adjustment. When
external reserves rise, the government's excess demand falls (that is,
its deficit turns to surplus, or becomes smaller in absolute magnitude,
or a surplus gets bigger); and when reserves fall, the government's
excess demand rises. This pattern has its exceptions, but they are few.
To test the budgetary policy further, Table 9-4 analyzes .the epi-
sodes in which the budget was clearly either in a surplus or in a deficit
position. Movements of external reserves are given in column 2 of
the table. It appears, as before, that the budgetary balance behaved
The "primary" liquidity is money supply, defined in the conventional way.
"Secondary" liquidity includes: (1) claims on the government; (2) claims on the
local authorities; and (3) claims on money-creating institutions, i.e., time deposits
and day-to-day loans, foreign-currency balances of residents, and balances in
savings accounts.THE NETHERLANDS 193
TABLE 9-4
THE NETHERLANDS: THE BUDGETARY BALANCE AND

















i1950 —ii1953surplus— rise * stable* normal — rises
iv1956 —iv1957deficit — fall —rises + low + rises
ii1960 —xx1961surplus— rise —falls — low + falls
ix1961 xv1962deficit* rise * stable
slightly
* normal* stable
ix1963 —iv1966deficit+ rise * stable— high * stable
NOTE: For explanation of symbols, see Table 8-3.
most of the time—but not consistently—contrary to what balance-of-
payments adjustment would require. The price stability target does not
appear to be generally served by budgetary policy, which seems to
be "neutral" to these targets. In general, budgetary imbalances (sur-
pluses or deficits) were rather small and apparently played only a
minor role in pursuit of short-term targets. During one episode only,
from the beginning of the period surveyed to the middle of 1953, were
budgetary surpluses large and consistent. As can be seen from Table
9-4, none of the targets represented there could explain the surpluses
during the period of the early 1950's. External reserves were rising
rapidly. Price increases were normal, that is, not exceeding their long-
term trend, or even slightly below it. Industrial production was also
rising at its normal rate, while employment was even falling. The large
surpluses must be explained either by other targets or as an accidental
phenomenon. One explanation sometimes suggested is that budgetary
policy was aimed at encouraging long-term growth by accumulating
capital through government saving. Another possibilityisthat the
surpluses resulted, as in Germany, from the planning of military ex-
penditures which did not in fact materialize.
Another interesting episode of budgetary imbalances is that of 1957.194DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
During that year, there was an obvious contradiction between the
requirements of the targets of balance-of-payments equilibrium and
price stability, on the one hand, and employment and output on the
other. In this year changes in circumstances abroad were, apparently,
particularly important and must have played a significant part in the
Netherlands' balance-of-payments situation. While most often, as has
been pointed out before, balance-of-payments deficits were accom-
panied by domestic expansions, this episode was an exception. External
reserves were falling and prices were rising rapidly, while unemploy-
ment was rising and industrial production falling. The budgetary policy
during those years appears to be expansive, as would be required by
the targets of employment and production. Monetary policy, on the•
other hand, if judged by the movements of money supply and interest
rates, was restrictive—as would be required by the balance-of-pay-•
ments equilibrium and price stability targets.
3. Summary and Interpretation
From the preceding analysis it seems clear that, at least during the.
1950's, monetary policy was strongly associated with the balance of
payments—although in a somewhat intricate manner, which, on the
surface, appears to involve contradictory tendencies.
,A point of major importance is the extremely high share of foreign
trade in the economy of the Netherlands. Foreign trade in proportion
.to national income is higher in the Netherlands than anywhere in
Europe (save Luxembourg, which for economic purposes may in effect
be considered a region of Belgium). Any change of a given propor-
tion in exports or imports carries thus a heavier weight in the Dutch
economy than in most other countries. Since the ratio of external re-
serves to trade is not particularly low in the Netherlands, the large
trade. means also a large size of reserves in relation to income or to
money supply. A given proportional change in reserves thus has a par-
ticularly large monetary impact, there.
Any imbalance of payments has thus a very large automatic impact
on the economy of the Netherlands in comparison with other coun-
tries; and this inflationary or deflationary impact seems to have been -
judgedtoo large by the Netherlands' policy makers—that is, the impact,
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and too little to other targets. Therefore, policy has been directed at
counteracting this automatic impact. Thus, the discretionary monetary
policy runs counter to the requirements of balance-of-payments adjust-
ment. However, the counter-action is not complete, so that some ad-
justment is still allowed to take place.
Let us consider an imbalance in which external reserves fall. The
typical pattern of monetary policy would be as follows: fall of
reserves is, by itself, a factor which tends to diminish money supply
and commercial bank reserves. The lending capacity of banks is thus
reduced—a factor which, if not offset, would tend to lead to a further
reduction of money supply through reduced lending. At the same time,
demand for creditby the banks' customers probably tends to rise, due
to the drain on their liquidity caused by an imbalance in transactions
with the outside world.6 In effect, commercial-bank credit to the publiä
increases in such instances more often than it diminishes. This is ac-
commodated by replenishing the lending capacity of banks in three
principal ways. First, the minimum-reserve ratio of the commercial
banks is reduced; this is quantitatively of major importance. Second—
and this is normally much less significant—banks increase their bor-
rowing from the Netherlands Bank, despite an increase in the Bank's
discount rate. Third, net indebtedness of the government to the Nether-
lands Bank increases, thus raising the liquidity of the economy in
general and bank reserves iii particular. To some extent, as has been
mentioned earlier, this is an automatic reaction: lending by the public
(including commercial banks) to the government—in the form mainly
of acquisition of Treasury bills and bonds—falls, thus automatically
raising the government's indebtedness to the central bank. in other
words, some substitution takes place: the commercial banks increase
their lending to private customers at the expense of their lending to the
government. Yet even when an increase in commercial-bank credit
occurs, and is combined with the increased indebtedness of the govern-
ment to the Bank, the expansionary impact on money supply is not
sufficient to offset fully the initial effect of the decline in external re-
serves. In the end, the amount of money does go down from its level
in the period prior to the disturbance (or, more often, rises signifi-
cantly less than the trend). Interest rates thus go up—as indicated, for
instance, by the yields of short-term Treasury bills. The discount rate
is raised, presumably for three interrelated purposes: one is to prevent
6 It could also happen, however, that the increased demand for credit preceded
the balance-of-payments deficit, and was the cause of it.196DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
the banks from increasing their borrowing from the Netherlands Bank
to an even larger extent than they actually do; the second is to "fol-
low the market"—namely, some market rates (such as the yield of
Treasury bills) which rise through the aforementioned process of di-
minished liquidity and reduced demand for the bills; and third—and
this is probably a most important consideration—to indicate the trend
of policy. The discount rate is regarded in the Netherlands, as in many
other places, as a major weather vane of the government's intentions.
Moreover, interest rates on commercial-bank lending are traditionally
tied to the discount rate. As mentioned before, the rates on prime
loans are usually 1.5 to 2 per cent above the discount rate; they move
with the latter—as do other interest rates—in a semi-automatic way.
Since in the final analysis money supply is diminished and interest rates
should rise, the increase of the discount rate is thus called for.
This resolves the apparent contradiction between the movements of
the two major monetary instruments employed—the minimum-reserve
ratio and the discount rate. Minimum-reserve ratios. are reduced in
order to offset the automatic effect of a fall in external reserves. Yet
this is only a mitigation and not a full counteraction. Eventually, money
supply would fall and interest rates should rise—hence the increase
of the discount rate. Whether this whole pattern of monetary measures
should be called "restrictive" or the opposite is an open question.
Likewise, it may be debated whether this should be called an "adher-
ence" to the classical "rules of the game" or its opposite. According
to the definition suggested and defended earlier in this study, this
should indeed be regarded a compliance with the "rules of the game."
Similarly, when external reserves rise, the process runs in the oppo-
site direction. In general, no asymmetry shows up in the conduct of
monetary policy in the Netherlands. It appears to be equally consistent
in adhering to the pattern described here, both in the course of bal-
ance-of-payments surpluses and deficits.
Compliance with this pattern was almost uniform during the 1950's,
but from 1961 or 1962, this no longer holds true. From this point to
the end of the period surveyed, the level of external reserves was rather
stable in comparison with earlier years. Fluctuations in the level were
rather weak; and the existing slight upward trend was apparently re-
garded as a desirable feature, not strong enough to be considered a
disturbance. Monetary policy during these later years appears, thus, to
be less concerned with balance-of-payments developments. It is now
employed in the service of other targets as well—to: a large extent,THE NETHERLANDS 197
probably, the target of price stability.7 It is important to note that
the change in pattern came at a period of generally rising—albeit
slowly—external reserves. An element of asymmetry may be indicated
by this; however, it would be necessary to contrast a long period of
slightly and gradually declining reserves with this period in order to
check this indication, and such cannot be found.
Budgetary policy was oriented in a direction contrary to the re-
quirements of balance-of-payments adjustment more often than it was
in the direction which adjustment would require. This may be consist-
ent with the hypothesis that automatic income effects of the trade bal-
ance were considered more than sufficient to achieve the necessary ad-
justment, so that some counteraction was called for. In view of the
generally small size of either budgetary surpluses or deficits, however,
a conclusion that budgetary policy was indeed fashioned in this way
may not be justified. It seems that this policy was usually intended to
be "neutral," not only in relation to balance-of-payments develop-
ments, but also with regard to other major targets. It would be even
less correct to conclude that the combined pattern of monetary-
fiscal policy adhered to the well-known policy mix, assigning monetary
policy to the pursuance of balance-of-payments equilibrium and fiscal
policy for "domestic" targets. Only one episode—1956—57—might be
explained in this way. In this case, restrictive monetary policy could
have been intended to adjust the balance of payments and expansionary
fiscal policy, to counteract unemployment and slack production. In
the two other episodes of significant budgetary deficits, increases in
the discount rate are again found; but on these occasions the opposite
movements could not be explained by the requirements of balance-of-
payments equilibrium, on the one hand, and domestic. targets on the
other.
The rate-of-exchange instrument was used on only one occasion,
March 1961, when the rate was lowered (and the currency appreci-
ated) by 5percent. During the preceding period, external reserves
This impression is supported by the observation of quantitative credit restric-
tions. Their introduction in 1961 came at a time of rising external reserves; their
relaxation during 1962—63, at a time of stable reserves; and their reintroduction,
in 1963, again at a period of accumulating reserves. This would be consistent
with the pattern of the 1950's, of a counteracting policy. Yet the quantitative
restrictions since 1963 do not seem to be affected by the balance-of-payments
position. On the other hand, these years are characterized by substantial price
rises, which could explain the introduction and preservation of credit restric-
tions.198DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
were rising, and the economy was showing inflationary tendencies.
This, indeed, is a combination in which currency appreciation would
be a proper measure. However, the development of reserves and prices
prior to the revaluation does not seem to be radically different in size or
other circumstances than it was on many other occasions. The use of
currency revaluation in this instance may thus presumably be explained,
as, indeed, was insistently argued by policy makers when the measure
was taken, only by the fact of the similar German measure. Since Ger-
many is a major trading partner of the Netherlands, the appreciation
of the mark could be expected to intensify strongly the trends of ris-
ing external reserves and rising prices in the Netherlands. Speculation
could have contributed to it even further. It was thus not so much
actual developments as the anticipations of strongly intensified trends
which led to the Dutch measure. The fact that a change in the exchange
rate could be represented as following the lead of another country must
have also been a strong contributing factor. An additional explanation
could be the realization that a long-term accumulation of external re-
serves may be an indication of fundamental disequilibrium. Despite
this episode, it is obvious that during the period surveyed changing
the exchange rate was not considered a proper instrument for balance-
of-payments adjustment in the Netherlands.
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1. Policy Instruments
MONETARY POLICY
The Sveriges Riksbank, Sweden's central bank, is legally independent
of the government, and is directly responsible to the parliament. Most
members of the Board of Directors (except its chairman, who is a
government appointee) are nominated by—and are members of—the
parliament, which provides general guidance to the Riksbank's opera-
tions. In the actual conduct of policy, a large measure of cooperation
exists between the Riksbank and the government. Yet, the former
has been known to have on occasion acted independently, even with-
out prior consultation with the government.
The discount rate is the most significant of the monetary instruments
employed by the Riksbank. Left almost untouched until 1955, the dis-
count rate has been changed regularly (about once a year, on the
average) since the beginning of that year. As in most other countries,
these changes had little direct impact on the amount of commercial-.
bank borrowing from the Riksbank. Although not restricted to emerg-
ency situations, this borrowing was nevertheless quite limited and was
used primarily as a device for smoothing out short-term fluctuations
rather than as a long-term source of funds. In recent years the average
amount of this borrowing has increased, but changes in the discount
rate still do not play a major role in determining the size of borrowing.
During a few recent periods (mid-1961 to early 1962; early 1964 to
mid-1966), penalty rates were imposed on borrowings beyond given
quotas—a measure which apparently did have a large impact on the
amount of borrowing. In general, however, changes in the discount rate
were important primarily as a major signal of changes in over-all
policy. Rates of interest, both on bank deposits and on commercial-200DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
bank lending, tended to change with the discount rate, although the
association was not rigid or automatic, and on a few occasions the
order of change was reversed: the discount rate followed market rates
rather than the other way around.
In addition to discount policy, the Riksbank uses a variety of other
monetary instruments. Open-market operations are undertaken on
occasion, but not continuously. The government, which regularly sells
large amounts of its securities in the market, in fact carries out most
of the open-market operations by its debt policy. However, the Na-
tional Debt Office, which carries out these operations, works in close
coordination with the Riksbank. Minimum-liquidity ratios are also
regulated by the Riksbank. Actual formal changes in the ratios have
been rare, and most of the time the minimum requirements have been
of little relevance. But at the time of its introduction in 1952, the sys-
tem of minimum ratios was used as a restrictive measure. Later, on a
few occasions, the system was again used for this purpose, but more
by agreement with the banks and by persuasion than by the strict legal
enforcement of the schedule of liquidity ratios. Another and probably
more important instrument was the direct regulation by the Riksbank
of the amount of commercial-bank lending. A few times this took the
form of "moral suasion." From mid-1955 to mid-1957, however,
banks were actually instructed to reduce their credit by specific amounts
(gradually, the reduction reached 5percent of the amount outstanding
in mid-1955). The use of these various instruments, though by no
means unimportant, was sporadic and often cannot be quantified. As a
rule, they were applied in conjunction with changes in the discount
rate, though not necessarily at precisely the same time. Movements of
the discount rate may thus be taken to indicate the thrust of other' policy
instruthents as well.
BUDGETARY POLICY
Sweden, unlike many other countries, does not aimat a regular bal-
ance in the government's budget. It is assumed that a rough balance
in the budget should be attained over a number of years, but that for
each year, or for even longer periods, the budget may yield a deficit
or surplus. In other words, the budgetary balance—as well as specific
components of the budget—is regarded as an important instrument
in the conduct of short-term policy. The declared task of this policy is
to counteract cycles in domestic economic activity.SWEDEN 201
In order to facilitate the fulfillment of this task, several devices
have been introduced to make budgetary performance more flexible
than in most other countries. Thus, the amount of expenditures author-
ized in the budget is only a ceiling, and the government may use its
discretion in deciding whether or not to spend it fully. The government
has an inventory of public work projects, which may be activated or
terminated on a few months' notice when the need arises. Another im-
portant device is the "investment fund," a semibudgetary instrument
that allows considerable tax concessions to firms that refrain from in-
vestment in boom times, depositing their allocations to the fund in a
blocked account, while spending for investment in slack times. It is
relevant to note that the time schedule for the operation of this device
—that is, the decision on when is the proper time to save and when
to spend—is determined by the government's Labor Market Board;
the use of this tool is thus directly associated with the employment
situation.
As has been noted, the government borrows on a large scale in the
market. It also borrows from the Riksbank, which faces no legal limi-
tations on the amount or form of its lending to the government.
2. Statistical Analysis
The postwar record of Sweden is marked by an almost complete ab-
sence of balance-of-payments deficits of long duration or significant
size. The only exception is the period between the third quarter of 1959
and the first quarter of 1960; but even this brief deficit was not very
substantial in proportion to the country's trade, or even to its custom-
arily quite small external reserves. Except for this episode, a graph
of the level of the country's external reserves (as in Chart 10-1) has
the form of long plateaus, interrupted by a few brief and quite steep
upward steps. The first—and steepest—rise occurs from mid-1951 to
early 1952, when reserves (which had been almost stable since 1947)
more than doubled. The second upward movement took place between
early 1960 and mid-1962, when reserves again nearly doubled; the last
episode, a brief one, occurred between mid-1964 and early 1965.
A statistical analysis of the pattern of policy responses to balance-of-
payments developments in Sweden must therefore be very limited in
the number of observations covered. The summary presented in Table202DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
CHART 10-1














10-1is confined to the three periods of surplus just noted, the single
deficit episode of 1959—60, and several longer periods of stability.
Starting with the discount rate (column 2), it seems clear that its
movements do not conform to an assumption which would make them
dependent on the balance-of-payments position. The discount rate is
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NOTE: Diagonal-line areas represent period of downward imbalances; gray areas repre-
sent stability; white areas represent upward imbalances.
ond—except for a lowering of the rate in mid-1962, toward the end of
this relatively long period; and rising during the third. A response to
the balance-of-payments position, however, would require the lowering
of the rate during these periods. In the deficit period of Hi 1959—i 1960



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Similar conclusions hold for all the other monetary variables—the
Riksbank's nongovernment claims (column 3); the Bank's net claim
on the government (column 4); the Bank's total domestic claims (not
represented in Table 10-1, but very similar to the Bank's claim on the
government, which is the chief component of the Bank's total domestic
claims); the rate of expansion of commercial-bank credit (column 5);
andthe rate of expansion of money supply (column 6). In the exami-
nation of all these variables, the same pattern is repeated: when bal-
ance-of-payments movements (predominantly upward) take place, the
variables either show no response (remaining stable) or move in the
direction opposite to that which balance-of-payments adjustment would
require.
Examination of the budgetary balance (column 7) leads to a similar
conclusion with regard to this major fiscal variable. By and large, it
moves in the direction opposite to that which the target of balanced
external transactions would call for and in no single instance ismove-
ment in the adjusting direction found. Itis therefore safe to con-
clude that the budgetary instrument was not used in Sweden as a
means of maintaining stability in the balance of payments.
It thus appears that none of the monetary and fiscal instruments
examined were used for balance-of-payments adjustment. Tables 10-2,
10-3, and 10-4 are intended to investigate the possible relation of three
major variables—the discount rate, the credit supply and the budgetary
balance, respectively—to major economic targets. This may indicate
whether the lack of use of these instruments for balance-of-payments
adjustment might have been due to the assignment of the instruments
to other targets, whose claims conflicted with those of the balance of
payments. The only conclusion which emerges at all firmly from obser-
vation of these tables is that the budgetary balance changed regularly
in a manner consistent with the target of high employment (column 4
in Table 10-4). This conforms, of course, with the announced target of
budgetary policy, which is supposed to follow an anticyclical pattern
where the "cycle" refers mainly to the employment situation. The two
monetary variables (the discount rate and the rate of expansion of
money supply) give some indication—as may be seen from column
(5)inTables 10-2 and 10-3, respectively—that they were intended to
be used to maintain price stability. But the evidence is not very firm:
the pattern is not entirely consistent, and the variations in price move-
ments between periods of "high" and of "low" price increases are not



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































per cent per annum. It also seems that monetary policy was not tied to
price developments until the mid-1950's;.during these earlier years the
discount rate was practically stable, while credit supply—which did
fluctuate substantially—does not seem to have responded to the needs
of price stability. It is possible, though, that the pattern of changes in
credit supply during these earlier years was motivated by price de-
velopments, but with a quite considerable time lag.
3. Summary .and Interpretation
Sweden entered the 1950's with an unusually low level of external re-
serves in relation to its volume of international trade. From 1950 to
the end of the period surveyed, the absolute level of reserves increased
about fourfold in a few relatively short episodes interrupting long peri-
ods of stable reserves. Yet this increase only more or less kept pace
with the rising volume of the country's trade. Such an increase of
reserves could well have been regarded as desirable, rather than as a
disturbance which should be counteracted. Yet, the stability of the ab-
solute size of reserves during most of the period was also apparently not
considered a source of anxiety and a disturbance calling for adjustment
through restrictive policies. Thus balance-of-payments developments
appear not to have played a role in determining broad policy patterns in
Sweden. Major policy instruments were reserved for the achievement
and maintenance of other primary targets. Budgetary policy, which
appears to be more flexible than in most other countries, was regarded
as the major instrument to employ in counteracting cyclical fluctuations
in the domestic economy, and, in particular, cycles in the labor mar-
ket. Monetary policy does not appear to have followed the same con-
sistent pattern. It seems likely that, part of the time, monetary instru-
ments were used in the same way as fiscal policy, that is, for counter-
cyclical adjustment. At other times—either by coordinated design or,
not implausibly, due to a high degree of independence of the central
bank__monetary policy must have been intended to prevent substantial
price increases.
Only a single episode of an actual absolute fall of reserves of some
significance may be distinguished: it took place during late 1959 and
early 1960. During this time, the target of high employment appears
to have been given preference in budgetary policy over the target of210DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
balance-of-payments stability. Unemployment at that time was still
high, although declining, and the budget recorded an unusually large
deficit. Indications are less clear-cut for the monetary instruments. The
discount rate, the major instrument and the directional signal of mone-
tary policy, was raised, as balance-of-payments equilibrium would
require. In addition, "recommended" liquidity ratios of commercial
banks were raised. But commercial bank borrowing from the central
bank increased markedly, despite the higher discount rate—as is quite
usual under similar circumstances in other countries; and both com-
mercial-bank credit and money supply increased at a fast rate. The
evidence of this episode is thus inconclusive in the monetary spherc.
Needless to say, this review cannot suggest what the country's policy
patterns, in both the monetary and the budgetary areas, would have
been, had the country realized periods of substantial balance-of-pay-
ments deficits rather than a succession of periods of stability and of
surplus. It is thus relevant to point out that the apparent disregard of
the needs of balance-of-payments adjustment is confined to a period
in which balance-of-payments deficits were, by and large, absent.
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